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Introduction 
A NEW ACCOUNT OF LANGUAGE TRANSFER* 
Jacquelyn Schachter 
Many of us have, for some time, thought of transfer as a process. 
Transfer was something that the learner did. In fact, the very word 
itself implies some sort of a process . We say 'the learner transferred' 
a structure, phone, lexical item from one language to another, and, when 
we do, we envision some sort of action or movement, even though it may be 
abstract action or movement. 
My current view is that transfer is not a process at all, and is in 
fact a misnamed phenomenon - an unnecessary carryover from the heyday of 
behaviorism. What is currently viewed as evidence for the process of 
transfer is more appropriately viewed as evidence of a constraint on the 
learner's hypothesis testing process. It is both a facilitating and a 
limiting condition on the hypothesis testing process, but it is not in and 
of itself a process. 
In order to explicate this new notion of transfer, however, it is 
first necessary to sketch an account of the framework or perspective from 
which I view it, that is, to provide a characterization of the hypothesis 
testing process itself, so that this new explanation of transfer is made 
clear in terms of its relationship to the hypothesis testing process. 
• This is a revised version of a paper originally delivered at the IXth 
~pplied Linguistics Conference, the University of Michigan, March 1981 . 
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Surprisingly, although many researchers in second language'acquisition 
·assume such a process (we often adopt the Dulay and Burt (1974) term 
'creative construction' to l'efcr to it) little attention has been paid to 
what it might imply. Two questions need to be addressed. What do we 
mean when we say that adults learn second languages by formulating hypo-
theses and testing them against the data available to them? What onto-
logical committments are we making when we do so? 
What is needed, in fact, is a model of adult second language acqui-
sition which has at least the following characteristics: it explicates 
the notion that adults learn second languages by formulating and testing 
hypotheses; it incorporates an adequate account of transfer; it illuminates 
a large array of the facts currently available to us. 1 
1such a model will, of course, have to fulfill other conditions, not the 
least of which are: to provide an explanation of the fact that while child-
ren almost universally reach native speaker proficiency in their first 
language, adults rarely do so in their second language; and to account for 
data of adult learner production which appears to be developmental. This, 
however, is a book on language transfer, and I will not address these issues 
here. 
L•hat 1 propose to do here is to present a CQildidate model, one that has 
the characteristics mentioned and thus deserves further study. It is my 
adaptation to adult second language learning of a model developed 
originally to account for adult concept learning. The model rests on the 
work of psychologists such as Br~ner, Goodnow, Austin (1956), Rcstle (1962), 
Estes (1960) and others, but was developed explicitly by the cognitive 
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psychologist marvin Levine (see Levine 1975). lie calls it 'Hypothesis 
theory' or simply '~theory'. The idea of taking a model developed to 
account for adult human concept learning and adaptin~ it as an account for 
adult human second language learning rests on the assumption that there are 
significant similarities between them, and that the differences are not as 
significant as had previously been supposed. It is my claim that this is 
but the case, 1\to present the arguments in depth would require another paper. 
Not having that luxury, what T will do is diverge from the main goal of 
the paper long enough to present a few of the similarities and claimed 
differences between language learning and concept learning, and then 
return to an account of the model within which this new notion of transfer 
is to be explicated. 
Adult Concept Learning and Language Learning: Similarities and Differences 
The most obvious similarities reside in the characteristics of the 
learners. Both groups are adults, and thus do not present the problem of 
comparing cognitively mature and immature populations . In addition both 
groups already know one language or more, and thus can take advantage of 
this knowledge in approaching the new learning task , even though for 
concept learners the knowledge of a language will he less relevant than for 
language learners. 
The less obvious similarities involve the task and the situations the 
learners must deal with. With regard to the task itself, the similarity 
is ~xhibited by the fact that at the outset, in both concept learning and 
language learning, the subject does not know, except in a very general way, 
what it is that must be learned. 2 The task in both cases is to scan the 
2This kind of learning problem, in which the subject does not know what the 
solu~ion will be but has available certain principles for discovering it, 
may be contrasted with learning problems in which the solution is known 
at the outset and the task is to figure out how to arrive at the solution . 
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input and identify its dimensions, then to observe the regularities and 
· isolate the relevant dimension~. anJ fjnally to gcncr:tlize fron1 those 
relevant dimensions. 
With regard to the situations in which the task is attempted, it is 
the case that in both concept learning and language learning two situational 
variables are crucial: one involves the subject's control over the input 
and the other the provision of feedback to the subject . In concept learning 
there exist two basic variations on the subject's control over the input, 
each of which has situational an:1logs in language lcarnjng . ln one variation 
the subject has no control over the input and must extract information 
from data the subject may or may not be prepared to deal with (listening 
to a lecture, for instance). The obvi~us analogy in language learning is 
exhibited by the situation in which the learner is faced with a stream of 
speech from the native speaker which is not regulated in any way to 
accomodate the learner, such as when a na~ive speaker in one-on-one 
conversation docs not real he the limits tu the subject's proficiency or 
when the native speaker is addressing a primarily native-speaking group 
(lecture. radio, TV, etc.). In the other variation (called the Selection 
Condition experiment in the experimental literature) the subject can choose 
a certain dimension (or subset of dimension~} and test them out in the 
manner that seems most productive to the subject, not an outside controller 
(learning to operate a computer by interacting with it, for instance). 
In similar fashion the language learner can formulate and produce sentences 
and then wait and see if native speakers respond in the way the learner 
predicts they will (i.e., if the learner expected a yes/no response. did 
she get one?). 
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There are also, in concept learning, two basic variations on the 
provi~ion of feedback, each of which has situational analogs in language 
learning. In one variation, no feedback is provided (these are called 
Blank Trials in the experimental literature), thus leaving the subjects 
in the position of having to make their own assumptions about how well 
they are doing (this might be the case, for example, in trying to learn 
geometry from a textbook in which exercises arc provided, hut no answers). 
Lack of feedback on form, particularly negative feedback, is common in 
naturalistic language learning situations as the native speaker will 
often tolerate grossly deviant sentences from the learner, especially when 
the learner and the native speaker do not know each other well. ln the 
s 
second variation, the subject receivep feedback (Right or Wrong) after 
each attempt (a computer, for example, will provide feedback after each 
attempt at interacting with it). Consistent feedback after eac~h utterance 
~ 
is probably nonexis~ent in naturalistic language learning, but it may be a 
typical teacher behavior in the classroom during certain drills . lwwever, 
recent work on negative feedback (cf. Day, Chenoweth, Chun, Luppcscu 1981) indicates 
'h~t more feedback occurs than had previously been claimed to occur 
(cf. Long 1981~ in nonclassroom language learning situations. 
In The Psychology of Communication (1967) George Miller pr~sented 
a summary of the differences between concept learning and language learning 
as he saw them then, a summary which was no doubt influential in discour-
aging others from exploring the possibility of similarities between the two. 
It is certainly cited by others as providing convincing arguments against 
such an approach (cf. Braine 1971, Wason and Johnson-Laird 1972). But 
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viewed from the perspective of adult second language learning, some of the 
most crucial differences disappear, since they apply to child first 
language learning, but not to 11dult second. 3 Of the Jiffcrcnccs that arc 
3
some of the di ft\.••·cnccs Mi II er poi ntc.~u out (ht.·twecn chi lu first l<mguagc 
earning and adult concept learning) I have actually listed as similarities 
when comparing adult second language learning and adult concept learning. 
applicable in this case, three deserve discussion. 
The first is that in a concept learning experiment the things to be 
learned are typically presented visually. not verbally, thereby empha-
si~ing different kinds of patterning. This looks to be a possibly serious 
objection since if it were true the insights derived from concept learning 
experiments would not be applicable to the language learning case. 4 
4
rf it were true that visual and verbal learning really emphasized different 
kind:; of pattc.•rn in~. this woulu he useful to know. ( venture to guess 
that most adults who learn languages via the classroom get as much 
visual as verbal input. What we need are visual language learning studies 
(in which students lt!arn only throu~h the written medium) to compare with 
verbal ones to sec what, if any, the differences are. 
The only relevant discussion of this matter I know of is by Bever (1970) in 
which he relates certain visual processing difficulties and certain language 
processing difficulties to the same underlying and general cognitive restriction. 
It would be my expectation that such restrictions would indicate a more 
basic mechanism underlying and constraining in similar wnys the processing 
of both language and vision. 
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Another claimed difference is that even in artificial language 
learning tasks -- which on the face of it most closely resemble real 
language learning -- the experiments do not involve meaning. This js 
true, but is simply a failure of the experimenters (and also, possibly, 
inadequate technology). Miller himself suggests several interesting ways 
of adding meaning to artificial language learning tasks {see also 
Moeser (1977) for an interesting approach). 
The last difference is that the lan~uage learner, according to 
Miller, is acquiring a sensorimotor skill whereas the concept learner is 
figuring out an abstract cognitive pattern. This claim is only half true: 
the language learner must accomplish both whereas the concept learner 
only deals with one . To what extent the sensorimotor aspect of language 
learning affects the abstract cognitive aspect remains to be tested. 
On reflection, it appears to me that the similarities between adult 
concept and adult language learning are sufficient to pique one's 
interest, and that the differences, although they must be kept in mind, 
are not sufficient to force one to abandon the inquiry. One further 
reservation might be that it is inappropriate to claim that experimental 
learning studies will explicate what goes on in nonexperimental settings. 
Braine's response to just such a criticism is worth quoting here : "The 
claim that pattern learning abilities revealed in the laboratory are 
actually used in natural language acquisition rests at the moment on the 
inherent plausibility of the notion that language learners will use, in 
language learning, any abilities which they demonstrahly possess and 
which would obviously be useful in learning languages" (1971:162). 
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The Outlines of llypothc~is Theory 
The model, in essence, i~ quite simple. It involves 1) the notion of 
hypothesis formulating and testing behavior on the part of the learner; 
2) the concept of a univcr~e of hypotheses; 3} v;n·ious donmins within 
the universe; and 4) the notion of infcrcncin~ and sampling hchnvior on 
the part of the learner. 
The idea that learners formulate and test hypotheses against linguistic 
input has been with us for some time now and is generally, if not 
universally, accepted (but see Braine (1971) for arguments to the contrary). 
Hypothesis testing is, as Katz puts it, •similar in character to theory 
construction in science but without the explicit intellectual operations 
of the latter" (196(l:274-5). A language learning hypothesis is n prediction 
that language is organized in a certain way, and can be distinguished from 
5 
what psychologists call a response set in that the hypothesis is contin-
5ttcsponse sets arc exhibited by systcmat ic patterns in the heh:Jvior of a 
subject that persist despite disconfirmation. 
gent upon feedback whereas a response set is not. There is strong evidence 
to show that adults learn concept discrimination and the syntax of artificial 
languages by formulating and testing hypotheses against the data (cf. Bruner, 
Goodnow, Austin 1956; Wason and Johnson-Laird 1972; Levine 1970, Miller 
1967, etc.). And it is my claim that there is no strong evidence to show 
that adult~ le3rning n second language do otherwise (hut sec Reber (1967) 
in which a different interpretation of artificial language learning tasks 
is presented). 
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This notion is not a simple one. It involves. minimally, two 
kinds of infcrencing behavior by the learner -- inductivQ infercncing, in 
which the learner scans the data, observes regularities in it, :tnc..l gcncr-
alizes (that is, formulates a hypothesis) and deductive inferencing , in 
•j 
which the learner tries out the newly formed hypothesis to see if the data 
she observes arc consistent with it (that is, tests a hypothesis). Exactly 
how hypotheses are formed by the learner is not known . What H theory 
advocates claim is that the evidence is such that hypothesis formation by 
the learner must be inferred in order to account for the data (Levine 1975). 
How hypotheses are tested is an area in which considerable research has been 
carried out, at least in concept learning. and the information gathered 
so far is rather surprising. As any scientist knows. for example, 
the most efficient way to test a hypothesis is to look for dtsconfirm-
ation of it. Confirmation will not prove the hypothesis is correct, but 
disconfirmation will prove that it is wrong. Apparently, in concept 
learning tasks, normal adults (that is. non-scientists) do not do so. 
They tend to look for verification of their hypotheses, not disconfirmation 
(cf. Bruner, Goodnow, Austin 1956; Wason and Johnson-Laird 1972). 
This is not to say they do not take disconfirming evidence into account 
(as child first language learners occasionally do not), hut only that 
they do not seek it out. Eventually, disconfirming evidence sinks in 
and the learner is able to take advantage of it in reaching the correct 
hypothesis. Clearly much work needs to he done here, ~pacifically with 
language learning, since the whole question of negative data is a 
crucial one for any hypothesis testing modcl. 6 This model claims spe-
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6Braine (1971), for example, argues tli{t~ people learn languages without 
taking disconfirming evidence (negative data) into account. If this were 
. 
true, any H-tcsting model would have to be abandoned as an account of 
language learning since all such models depend crucially on the learner's 
making usc of di~confirmatinns to alter or reject wrongly fnrmular.ed 
hypotheses. The evidence that Braine uses to support his claim, however, 
is not convincing. 
cifically that disconfirming evidence results in the learner's abandoning 
the current hypothesis and looking for another. It makes no claims 
about what kinds of evitlcncc learners look for to test their hypotheses, 
confirming or Ji sconfirming. 
The idea behind the concept of a universe of hypotheses is that the 
learner brings to the task some notion of the hypotheses that might be 
worth testing. That set of hypotheses is called the universe. There are 
at least two sources for those hypotheses. The first source is the 
knowledge the learner has gained in previous learning i.n tasks of this 
kind. The second source is the new learning situation itself. And while 
the second source, the learning situation, probably has more salience at 
least at certain times, the first source, previously gained knowledge, ls 
always available to the learner. 
The concept of a universe is not that of a static list of hypotheses 
to· be checked out one by one, but rather one which expands as the learner 
gains experience. That is, as the learner becomes more proficient in the 
target language, she will develop hypotheses on the basis of experience 
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with the target, and these will be added to the ever-expanding list of 
hypotheses available so that while some are being tested and dropped, 
others are being added. These others, which have as their source the 
language learning situation itself (the input) might at times result in 
what are called developmental errors . It should be noted, however, that 
although the learner hL1s, in theory, the whole." univer~c. of hypotht.·s cs 
available at all times, because of such things as disconfirming evidence, 
the salience of certain hypotheses, etc., the learner may at any point 
ignore some of the available hypotheses and focus on certain others. 
In that sense one could say that the set of hypotheses available to the 
learner contracts as well as expands. 
The notion of domains within the universe involves the idea that 
hypotheses will fall into natural groupings. that is that groups of 
hypotheses will share certain characteristics, which in Hypothesis theory 
are called domains, but which linguists might prefer to label abstract 
categories. The concept of a domain should be a familiar one to 
linguists. When we talk of the syntactic knowledge (or intuitions) of a 
language that speakers have, we are talking about their internal organ-
ization of sentences into clause types, phrase types, lexical categories, 
etc. These categories are what, in this framework, are called domains. 
The work of such psycholinguists as Miller, Bever and others has shown us 
that there is con:;idcrablc evidence for such internal structuring of 
7 
speech . 
71 want to make it clear at this ·point that I am not claiming that 
speakers 'know' they have these internal categories/domains, but only 
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that in their behavior that they act in such a way as to lead the inves-
"tigator to infer that they have such categories/domains . And in exactly 
the same wny psychologi.!>ts s:.y pc-oplc :.ct as if they h11ve conceptual 
domains, linguists say people act as if there are linguistic categories. 
It bcc.:om~s inlllJCI.Iiat~.~ly l'll•:n·, thl!IJ t.h:1t there mu~t he different , 
shapes and si~es of domains: 1) there are larger and smaller domains 
(eg., within the domain of main verbs in English, some take complements 
and some do not; so, 'main verh~ tlmt take complements' is a smaller 
domain than 'main verbs'); 2) there are crosscutting domains (eg., each 
of the common noun and proper noun domains of English is divided by the 
concrete noun and abstract noun domains, as arc the concrete and 
abstract noun domains cross cut by the common and proper noun domains); 
3)there are simple do111ains and complex domajns, and there are even 
different kinds of complex domains (eg • • conjunctive domains (A and B 
and C), disjunctive domain5 (A~ B), scq~cnce domains (eg .• ABRA, ARAB, 
etc.). 
In sum, a simple characterization of the model is as follows: 
1) the learner has available a universe of hypotheses; 2) the hypotheses 
are clustered into domains; 3) the learner chooses a domain and samples 
hypotheses within it; 4) the learner tests the hypotheses against the 
input . 
The Transfer Hrpothesis 
The Levine hypothesis is that "The 5 infers from the first n solutions 
the domain within the universe from which the (!!.+l)th solution will be 
taken . Then 5 samples hypotheses from that domain (J.evine 1975:271) ! My 
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adaptation of the transfer hypothesis is: the learner infers from 
previous knowledge the domain within the universe from which the solution 
to the current target language problem will he taken. Then the learner 
samples hypotheses from that domain. 
There are th.ree possible outcomes here. The first is that the 
learner may choose the wrong clomain, either because the input has pro-
vided conflicting signs or because the learner has assumed that a 
preestablished domain of the native language is the relevant domain for 
the second language. The latter case, but not the former, will be an 
. 8 
instance of transfer. 
8There may actually be evidence for this kind of transfer in what I call 
word salad utterances produced by learners which upon attempted analysis 
provide few or no clues to what syntactic structure the learner was 
trying to produce. Examples of word salad sentences abound in learner 
production but one example produced by a learner of English is: 
"Some American schools could careless even the instructors if our· English 
knowledge and background are inadequate and limited vocabularies as well." 
The problem with sentences like this one is that the syntac structure is so 
obscure that semantic interpretations abound. Two possible interpretations 
for instance are:l) that some American schools could even employ 
instructors who nrc not very knowledgeable since with our innclcquate 
English and limited vocabulary, it wouldn't make any difference;2) that in 
some American schools even the instructors could care less if our English 
knowledge and background are inadequate and we have limited vocabularies as well . 
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My suspicion is that the researcher has few clues here precisely hecause 
the learner's attempt was in the wrong domain. 
The second possible outcome is that the learner may choose both the correct 
domain and the correct hypothesis, either because the learner has done a 
good job of analyzing the input or because the native and target language 
structures are identical and the learner has recognized the fact. The 
latter, but not the former. will be an instance of positive transfer. of 
the traditionally identifit>d kind. The last po~.sihlc outcome is that the 
learner may choose the correct domain but the wrong hypothesis, either 
because of a partly mistaken analysis of the input or hecausc of the 
learner's correctly equating the relevant domains of the native and target 
languages but incorrectly assuming a hypothesis that would be appropriate 
for the native language but not for the target language. This latter case 
is what is generally recognized as transfer error. 
This view of transfer carries with it certain consequences that need 
to be made clear. The first is that the learner's previous knowledge 
at any point in the learning process will include not only the learner's 
knowledge of 1.1, hut also any knowledge the learner m:1y h:tve of the target 
9 language. including what might he called 'imperfect knowledge', as well as 
91 have in mind here the possibility that the learner has constructed a 
hypothesis which leads to the production of a structure which is neither 
native-like nor target-like, that is, a typical interlanguage structure. 
If that hypothesis is in force when a second related hypothesis is being 
constructed, it may very well influence the form of the second hypothesis. 
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the learner's expectations concerning the target language, conscious or 
otherwise. What might count as a trnm•fcr error in this model is con!>iu-
erably more extensive than what many others hnvc claimed. tt will 
include some of what is now called intralingual error data (although 1 think 
there is a distinction to be made between a transfer error and a develop-
mental error) as well as some of the prediction data that Kellerman (1979) 
and Jordens (1977) have identified (that is, behavior that corresponds 
to predictions that learners of a target language have prior to and during 
their experience with it, predicti ons which are independent of the facts 
of the target l•mguugc, and which :an• typically h:ascd un knowledge of the 
native language alone). 
Another consequence is that one's Ll knowledge has as much influence 
on the learning of an unrelated second languugc as on the learning of a 
related one. The evidence may differ, and typically does differ, but the 
influence i s still there . Such phenomena as slower learning (cf. Hakuta 
(1976) on Uguisu's acquisition of articles) and overproduction (cf. 
Schachter (1974) on avoidance and Schachter and Rutherford (1979) on 
overproduction), and choice of wrong domain (cf. footnote 8, this article) 
should be relatively more evident in the data of a learner of an unrelated 
target, whercns interference (choice of correct domain hut wrong hypo-
thesis) and positive transfer (choice of correct domain and correct hypo-
thesis) should be more evident in the data of one who learns a related 
language. 
Furthermore, and most significantly, what is called transfer is, 
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within this model, simply the set of constraints that one's previous 
knowledge i mposcs nn th<' llmna ins from wh il-h tn sc ll'l't hypntiH'scs :1hout 
the new data one is attending to. As one learns the target language 
through this process of observation, hypothesis formation and hypothesis 
testing, the structure of these domains changes and the learner has 
available at time. ~ parti~lly different set of domains than at time. 1 1 1- • 
This leads directly to the last consequence, which is that within this 
model, transfer can be accounted for without positing it as a distinct 
process. There is simply no need to infer from transfer data an 
underlying process of transfer. lt c:an he explicated more simply in 
terms of such basic concepts as inferencing and sampling behavior, 
domains and hypothests, concepts which are needed within the model for 
other re~sons :my\~"Y . 
Transfer Data 
Given the model and thus the characterizations of domains, hypotheses, 
inferencing and sampling behavior, we have available the paraphernalia to 
account for a large amount of rather disparate-appearing transfer data. 
One c:1n envision comparing two hypothetical learners with regard to 
• 
the acquisition of a particular structure in the same target language along 
D,. no1' 
three dimensions: 1) whetherAthey have the same native language 
(:1nd also the same second language for a third target language); 
2) whether in the target language they choose the same domain or different 
domains; and then 3) given their choice of the same domain, whether the 
hypotheses they select are the same or different. Table 1 displays 
the various possibilities. 
-46-
Table 1 
Comparison of Hypothetical Learners Along Three Dimensions 
Native Language Target Language 
domain hypothesis 
1. same same same 
2. sa~e same different 
3. same different 
4. different different 
s. different same different 
' 
6. different same same 
Case 1, in which the two learners have the same native language and 
choose both the same domain and the same hypothesis is, presumabl9, a 
typical situation for speakers of language A learning language B. Their 
previous knowledge is cLose to identical (I am excluding the possibility 
of different dialects here) and their experiences with the 
target language are similar enough for them to arrive at the same hypo-
thesis. But it is not the only possibility. These two learners may very 
well choose the same domain but arrive at different hypothesis, as in Case 2. 
That is, they could have somewhat different perceptions of the target 
language, or somewhat different experiences with it. The most interesting 
situation would be Case 3, in which two learners with the same native 
language choose hypotheses from totally different domains, even given com-
parable exposure to the target language. One would expect this case to 
occur relatively less frequently than other cases. Case 4 reflects a 
typical cross-language experience in which the two learners have different 
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native languages (and let us assume the simplest case, where the native 
languages arc not related) and choose different domains. Cases 5 and c,, 
in which the learners have different native languages and choose the same 
domain, reflect the fact that there are linguistic universals and typological 
groupings, and thus limits to the ways in which languages can differ. 
Case 6, furthcnnore, reflects the reality that any two languages, even if 
they are totally unrelated, will exhibit certain similarities such that it 
would be possible, on the basis of native language alone, for two speakers 
of unrelated languages to arrive at the same wrong (or right) hypothesis 
in the target language, although again one would expect this to occur 
less often than other cases. 
It is important to note at this point that so far I have been inter-
preting the chart as if the only relQvant learner knowledge were native 
language knowledge. If one were to make probability predictions on the 
basis of this interpretation one would claim Cases 1 and 4 to be most 
likely, Cases 2 and 5 next most likely, and Cases 3 and 6 least likely. 
But if the chart were to be interpreted as if the only relevant knowledge 
were the target language knowledge, the probability predictions would be 
quite different. In that case one would expect Cases 1 and 6 to be most 
likely, Cases 2 and 5 next most likely, and Cases 3 and 4 least likely. 
Since both native language and target language knowledge are relevant it 
is advisable to view the chart as quite distinct from probability 
predictions. 
The data that follow are organized so that each numbered set of data 
is an example of the corresponding numbered case in the chart above. Most 
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of the data appear in Schachter and Hart (1979). 
Case l, involving Farsi speakers learning relative clauses in 
~nglish, is a case in which speakers of the s~mc lan~unge choose 
the same domain and also the same hypothesis from that domain~0 
101 have not had a Farsi-speaking student in any class I've taught who 
did not do this, and I have had many Farsi speakers as students. Of 
course it would not be expected of beginning level students who have 
not yet reached the stage of embedded clause production. 
l.a) Today you can find rural people that they don't have education. 
l.b) There is three roads which people can take them to reach Caspian. 
The explanation for this is that Farsi is a language in which relative 
clauses are marked by epenthetic pronouns. There has been some disagreement 
about the facts of Farsi among several researchers working on relative 
clause acquisition recently, regarding whether or not the epenthetic 
pronoun appears when a subject noun is relativized (Gass 1979, Kellerman 
1979). My understanding is that there are certain dialects in which the 
relativized subject is marked as in (l.a) and others in which it is not. 
In the Tehran dialect, the prestige dialect of the country, it is not so 
marked. Often, though, when an informant is describing the facts to the 
unsuspecting linguist, the informant will try to describe what occurs in 
the prestige dialect rather than the one she actually speaks. If my under-
standing of the facts is correct, Tehran dialect speakers should produce 
sentences in English like (l.b) but not like (l.a), and speakers of certain 
other dialects should produce sentences like hoth (l.h) and (l.a) . 11 For 
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Gass (1979) has an alternative and interesting explanation involving the 
"claim that there is no c.•pcntht•t k pronoun in the suhject in Farsi, nnd th<Jt 
the learner transfers the )lener:ll ca:;e to Hn)llish (direct object, indirect 
object. object of preposition) and then generalizes to the exception (sub-
ject). We await further developments in the study of Farsi dialects . 
Farsi learners of English relative cla~ses the learner domain in this 
case is: relative clau~es; the learner hypothesis is: to mark a relative 
1 dd . 1 fl f h 1 . . d 12 c ause. a a pronom1na re ex o t e re at1v1ze noun. 
12This is, of course, in addition to other relative clause markers, such 
as the relative pronouns. the position of the relative clause, etc . 
Case 2, involving Arabic speakers learning English passives, is one 
in which learners with the same native language choose the same domain, 
but different hypotheses. to fit the facts. ln the acquisition of the 
passive, what I lwvc found amonR Arahic speakers arc two typicnl error types. 
The first involves adding an appropriate (tensed} form of be but not 
adlling the past p:1rticiplc.~ form to the anain vcrh. 
2.a) Oil was discover in the 19th century. 
2.b) Their people is more educate than others part. 
The domain for these learners is: the passive construction; the hypo-
thesis is: to mark the passive add a tensed form of be. Examples (2 . c) 
and (2.d) display the second pattern, in which the past participle form of 
the main verb is used, but no form .of be is added. 
2.c) But when oil discovered in 1948 and began export it in 1950 .. . 
2.d) This theatre built with different design from the others. 
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The domain for these learners is the same: the passive construction; but 
the hypothesis they choose is different : to mark the passive usc the past 
participle form of the main verh . 13 Because the data from which these 
13It should be noted that the verbs in these sentences are all transitive 
verbs in Arabic and allow passivization. 
sentences were extracted is crossectional, no conclusion can be drawn 
as to whether or not these two sentence types represent stages in the 
development of the English passive by Arabic learners. What is known is 
that none of the 75 Arabic speakers in the data base produced both 
error types in one sample . 
Case 3, in which two learners have the same native language and 
yet choose different domains may best be exemplified with avoidance 
phenomena. I have argued elsewhere (Schachter 1974) that Chinese 
learners of English avoid producing relative clauses because they find 
them quite difficult. But Chinese learners of English know--at some 
level--that they are going to have to be able to modify nouns. What can 
they do? One approach is to continue working on those difficult rela-
tive clauses until they are finally mastered, and some learners undoubtedly 
do this. The other approach would be to find some other way of modifying 
nouns that wasn't so difficult --noun complements, for example. 
Schachter and Hart (1979) speculated that Chinese learners do precisely 
this: develop and use noun complements to modify nouns as an alternate 
to using relative clauses. Sometimes this is communicatively successful; 
other times it results in error, as in (3.~) and (3.b) below. 
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3.a) There is two kinds of people to visit the museum. 
3 .1> J The 1·c i s a ~a ~"';hi\• t u J ntp tluwu a r i Vl: , •• 
These ar~hinese-produced noun complement error~ which appear to English 
speakers as if they should not be noWl complements at all, b.ut rather 
relative clauses (that is, thnt (3.a) for example should have been "there 
is two kinds of people who visit the museum."). My claim is that 
Chinese learners initially make one of two choices: Jomain1, (easy) 
noun complements, domain2 , (hard) relative clauses. 
Case 4, in which learners of different and unrelated native lan-
guages chouse Jiffel'cnt Jumains, is nicely exempli ficJ hy the cumpttrison 
of Spanish speakers with Arabic speakers on the learning of the modal can. 
The Spanish speakers typically produce sentences like (4.a) and (4.b): 
4.a) The poor.pcople there can to do anything. 
4.b) He can't to eat. 
Arabic speakers Jo not do this . They seem to choose hath the correct 
domain :md the correct hypothesis. The account· for this is that all 
verbs are main verbs in Spanish; there is no modal subclass. Poder, the 
Spanish translation of can, is a main verb which, by the way, takes an 
infinitival complement. So for the Spanish speaking learners of English 
the domain is: main verbs; and the hypothesis is: ~(as main verW takes 
an infinitival complement. For Arabic speakers this is not the case since 
gadar, the Arabic equivalent of~· does in fact belong to a subclass of 
modal verbs (along wi~h baga 'want', raad 'feel like doing something', 
haawal and inrr:1h 'try to do somcthin~'). The Arahic cnsc is thus one of 
positive transfer. 
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Case S, in which speakers of different languages choose the same 
domain but different hypotheses is exemplified in the comparison of the 
examples in (4) with the example~ in · · (5). Chinese spe:1kcrs, a5 
opposed to Spanish speakers,produce forms as in (S.a) and (S.h). 
S.a) 1 can working. 
S.b) So I can't learning soon. 
The ManJarin c.'tluivulent of~· ncng, can ulso be viewed as a verb 
that takes a complement. Why they produce the -ing form is not as present 
clear. The domain from which the Chinese spe~kers choose their hypothesis 
is the same as th:1t of the Sp:ani sh speakers: mn in verbs; they differ only 
in the form of the complement they choose (that is, in the specific 
hypothesis), the Spanish choosing the infinitival, the Chinese choosing 
the gerundive. 
Case 6, in which speakers from unrelated languages arrive at not only 
the same domain but also the same hypothesis, is exhibited by the nonuse 
of subject pronouns by both Japanese and Spanish speakers. Compare first 
(6.a) and (6.c) and then (6.b) and 6.d). 
Japanese 
6.a) Mt. Fuji is world famous looks beautiful. 
6.b) In my country hasn't army, navy and air force. 
Spanish 
6.c) The fountain of work in Venezuela is petroleo; is our 
principle fountain of ~ork. 
6.d) In Venezuela is holiday hoth days. 
It appears that for both Japanese and Spanish learners suhject marking is 
unnecessary once the topic is identified. And of course this is a 
reflex of subject marking constraints in their respective native languages. 
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Conclusion 
At this point a recapitulation of the major developments of this 
paper is in order. We have here an outline of a mode 1 of aduJ t concept 
learning which looks like an excellent candidate for adoption and adaptation 
as a model of adult language learning . Within that model we have an 
account of the notion of transfer toguther with several examples of 
language lcnrncT production which c:m he explicntcd using this account. 
It is an approach to transfer in which the notion of transfer as a process 
is replaced by the notion of transfer as a constraint imposed by 
previous knowledge on a more general process, that of inferencing. 
Thus it is. a simpler modeJ than one in which transfer is viewed as onto-
logically distinct. We also have an expanded notion of previous 
knowledge: the basis from which one infers the domain from which the 
correct hypothesis will be taken to account for new data. This previous 
knowledge includ<.'s 1.1 knowJc&.lgc nnd :also the learner ' s conceptuulization 
of the target language . 
Presumably, the search for tests.of the model will leave us with 
sufficient work to do in the future so that we won't be disturbed if, 
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